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Abstract
We take a coordination game and add the option to wait; each player can opt to take an action
in the standard game or they can decide to wait. If one player has taken a standard option, the
waiting player can adopt their best response to this action. Interpreting the payoff in the final
period (when there is no waiting possible) as a outside option or default, we show that a
party's equilibrium payoff can be decreasing in their default. Further, a player's role of leader
or follower alternates as the number of waiting periods changes.
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Situations in which parties need to coordinate their actions are ubiquitous. If possible,
parties will try to avoid coordination failures, for example by engaging in pre-game
communication (Farrell 1987). Two potential alternative ways of avoiding a coordi-
nation failure is to wait (allowing the party that waited the opportunity to adopt the
best response to the other player's action); and, second, having an equilibrium exoge-
nously selected for the players by, for instance an arbitrator or by social precedent.
In this paper we examine the interaction between these two coordinating devices. We
show that in combination their e®ect can be somewhat perverse.
2 The model
Take a standard 2-by-2 coordination game. There are two players; each can choose
from the set of two possible actions. Let the payo®s be given by the following ¯gure,






Figure 1: The normal form of the standard coordination game
In this coordination game there are three Nash equilibria: two pure strategy
equilibria - (T;R) and (B;L) - and a mixed strategy equilibrium. In many cases the
parties will develop institutions to avoid coordination failures. Let us assume that
both players believe that the outcome of this game will be (T;R). As mentioned
above, this could come about because of precedent or it could be the outcome that
is decreed by a third party.
Now, augment the game to allow each party the option to wait - denoted as W -
for one period. In this case, in period 1, each player can wait and not select a regular
action (either T, B, L, or R, depending on the player). Further, if one player waits
and the other selects a regular action, the waiting player can observe their choice. In
the second, and ¯nal, period, the player that waited can choose their best response to
the action that has been taken. If both players wait, the game proceeds to the second
period, in which the stage game is represented in Figure 1, with its exogenously given
equilibrium outcome (T;R). This can be interpreted as a situation in which, if the
players have not resolved the coordination issue by a certain deadline, it is resolved
for them.
The relevant normal form of this augmented game is shown in Figure 2. If both
players select a standard action, the payo®s are identical to the standard coordination




T 0;0 b1;c2 b1;c2
B c1;b2 0;0 c1;b2
W c1;b2 b1;c2 b1;c2
Figure 2: The relevant normal form of the augment game
the second period player 1's best response is B - thus the payo® to the parties will be
(c1;b2). If player 1 waits and player 2 chooses R, player 1 will opt for T in the second
period, yielding payo®s of (b1;c2). A similar logic applies when player 2 waits and
player 1 takes a standard action. Finally, note, if both players wait we return to the
standard 2-by-2 coordination game in the second and ¯nal period, the equilibrium of
which is given as (T;R) with its payo®s (b1;c2).
We use the notion of weak domination to solve this augmented game. Player 2
will have a weakly-dominant strategy to wait (W) - she cannot do better by taking
either of the other two actions L or R in period 1. Given that we can cancel the ¯rst
two actions of Player 2, Player 1 has an incentive to preempt the last period outcome
and take an action immediately - she will choose B. If player 1 plays B immediately,
she guarantees that the eventual outcome will be (B;L), which is preferable to her
than (T;R), the outcome that occurs if both players initially wait. Consequently, the
unique equilibrium payo®s arising from weak domination are (c1;b2). Notably here,
the outcome di®ers from the exogenous ¯nal period outcome of (b1;c2); the party
that has the larger default payo® at the deadline ends up in equilibrium receiving the
smaller payo® of the two parties.
This simple idea has several general implications. First, the ¯nal-period outcome
gives one party a stronger position - we could interpret this position as an outside
option or a default. When this is combined with the option to wait, in an attempt to
preempt this default outcome, the weaker party acts immediately. Further, because
of its seemingly advantageous default, the player with the larger default payo® waits.
Taken together, these strategies have the e®ect that strong default position actually
lowers the equilibrium payo® of a player. This is an unexpected result. For example,
in the bargaining literature, a party's payo® is often non-decreasing or increasing
in their outside option (for example, as in Shaked and Sutton 1984). Here, in the
two-period game a player's equilibrium payo® is decreasing in her outside option.
Second, it is also notable that it is seemingly the weaker party that moves ¯rst.
This is the opposite to the result of van Damme and Hurkens (2004). In their model,
the ¯rm that sets their price ¯rst in the risk-dominated equilibrium is the strong
(low-cost) ¯rm.
Third, if an additional potential waiting period is added to the game the role of the
players again switch. With three potential periods, the player with the strong default
position in the ¯nal period will have an incentive to move immediate (in period 1) to
2avoid being locked into the (B;L) outcome by player 1 in the two-period game. The
relevant normal form of the 3-period game is illustrated in Figure 3. In this longer
game, the payo® from waiting in the ¯rst period is the payo® in the two-period game
(c1;b2) - this is illustrated by the payo® that arises when the actions taken in the ¯rst




T 0;0 b1;c2 b1;c2
B c1;b2 0;0 c1;b2
W c1;b2 b1;c2 c1;b2
Figure 3: The relevant normal form of the 3-period augment game
Again using the elimination of weakly-dominated strategies, Player 1 now has a
weakly-dominant strategy to wait. Given this, Player 2 will choose R immediately. If
the number of periods in the game are extended further, the role of the players switch
again; when one party has the strong default position it is the other party that will
take an action immediately. Consequently, a player's payo® in equilibrium moves
non-monotonically with respect to their default (¯nal-period) payo® as the number
of periods in the game changes.
Finally, in the two-period game player 1 is hurt by the fact that she cannot commit
not to wait. Similar results arise in other papers in the literature. For example, Solan
and Yariv (2004) examined a game in which one party has the option to engage in
espionage by purchasing a noisy signal of the other player's action. Anticipating
the espionage, the non-spying player uses the opportunity to commit to particular
action - in e®ect the second player becomes the Stackelberg leader. It can be the
case that the ¯rst player would like to commit not to spy. However, given this is not
is possible, the player with the opportunity to spy becomes the Stackelberg follower,
and is ultimately disadvantaged by its ability to engage in espionage.
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